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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Between 2011 and 2012, the Third Circuit decided an antitrust case 
involving a company owned by the Chinese government;1 the Seventh 
Circuit decided a case involving companies based in Canada, Russia, and 
Belarus;2 and the Northern District of California decided a dispute involving 
companies from South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.3  As federal courts in the 
United States are confronted with a rising number of antitrust lawsuits 
implicating foreign conduct and foreign interests,4 other countries are 
becoming increasingly concerned about United States interference with the 
regulation of foreign markets, particularly because of the potential for 
foreign citizens to bypass their own antitrust regulation systems in favor of 
the more generous treble-damages remedy available in American courts.5  In 
the midst of this concern, uncertainty has arisen among circuit and district 
courts as to whether the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
 
 1.  Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012). 
 2.  Minn-Chem., Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848–49 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 3.  In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958–59 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 4.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27 n.5, China Minmetals Corp. v. Animal Sci. Prods., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) (No. 11-846), 2012 WL 30298, at *27 n.5 (“The increasing frequency of 
disputes involving the FTAIA is evidenced by the growing number of cases in which district courts 
have addressed the issue.  While the number of reported district court cases with FTAIA rulings in 
the first fifteen years of the statute’s existence can be counted on two hands, those same two hands 
can be used to count the FTAIA’s appearance before district courts in just the last two years.”). 
 5.  In the Supreme Court’s most recent antitrust decision involving foreign conduct, several 
foreign nations filed amicus briefs voicing concern about the United States interfering in their 
antitrust regulation systems, which can differ significantly both in the conduct prohibited and in the 
remedies available.  See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167–68 
(2004); see also Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. 
L. REV. 343, 384 (1997) (describing how the reach of American antitrust law has been met with 
resistance from other countries). 
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(FTAIA)6 limits the subject matter jurisdiction of United States courts over 
foreign anticompetitive conduct or instead establishes an additional element 
to a Sherman Act claim.7  This uncertainty has led to inconsistent foreign 
antitrust decisions both among the circuits and among district courts within 
the same circuit, further aggravating the confusion about the reach of United 
States antitrust law.8 
Historically, the FTAIA was widely considered a limitation on subject 
matter jurisdiction rather than on the merits of an antitrust claim.9  However, 
in August 2011, the Third Circuit overruled its precedent and declared that 
the FTAIA imposes a substantive-merits limitation rather than a 
jurisdictional bar.10  Since that decision, some courts have followed suit: in 
October 2011, for example, a California district court disregarded Ninth 
Circuit precedent11 and agreed with the Third Circuit that the FTAIA did not 
address subject matter jurisdiction.12  Most notably, in June 2012, the 
Seventh Circuit became the second circuit court to overrule its precedent in 
favor of an elements-based interpretation of the FTAIA.13  However, not all 
courts have agreed with this interpretation, and the circuits are now split.14 
This shift in the way some courts understand the FTAIA is largely a 
result of a recent set of Supreme Court cases meant to clarify when a statute 
will be treated as jurisdictional.15  In 2006, the Supreme Court decided 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., articulating the standard that the legislature must 
“clearly state” that a statute’s scope is jurisdictional in order for it to be 
treated as such.16  The Court subsequently refined the test to focus on the 
 
 6.  15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).  
 7.  See infra notes 138–77 and accompanying text. 
 8.  See infra notes 138–77 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See infra notes 43–58 and accompanying text. 
 10.  Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) (overruling Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 
(3d Cir. 2002)). 
 11.  United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 12.  In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958–59 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
However, other district courts in California have continued to treat the FTAIA as jurisdictional.  See, 
e.g., In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07–md–01819 CW, 2010 
WL 5477313, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010); Sun Microsys. Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 608 
F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 13.  Minn-Chem., Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2011) (overruling United 
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 14.  See infra notes 138–77 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See infra notes 88–136 and accompanying text.   
 16.  546 U.S. 500, 515 (2012). 
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intent of Congress17 and the legal character of the requirement,18 a non-
categorical approach that takes into account factors such as text, context, and 
relevant historical treatment.19  Although neither Arbaugh nor any of the 
subsequent cases applying the “clearly states” test have involved the FTAIA, 
courts ruling on the FTAIA since 2006 have relied heavily on the reasoning 
of Arbaugh and its progeny in their analyses of the statute.20  Most modern 
courts hold that Arbaugh supports a substantive interpretation of the FTAIA, 
but there are also compelling arguments that Arbaugh supports a 
jurisdictional interpretation of the FTAIA.21 
This Comment explores the history and reasoning behind this recent re-
examination of the FTAIA in light of Arbaugh, examines both the propriety 
and the implications of the competing interpretations of the FTAIA, and 
argues that the resolution of the competing approaches is beyond the 
purview of the lower courts.  Part II provides an overview of the 
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act leading up to the FTAIA, as well as 
the judicial treatment of the FTAIA prior to Arbaugh.22  Part III discusses the 
impact of Arbaugh and subsequent Supreme Court cases applying the 
“clearly states” test on the jurisdictional characterization of the FTAIA, 
ultimately leading to a circuit split.23  Part IV applies the “clearly states” test 
to the FTAIA and looks at the factors that weigh in favor of and against a 
jurisdictional interpretation of the FTAIA.24  Part V explores the 
consequences of the competing approaches25 and contends that the lower 
courts should not decide the jurisdiction issue because the Supreme Court 
and Congress possibly differ in their approaches to the extraterritorial reach 
of American law—rather, the Supreme Court should address the issue and 
Congress, either by silence or legislative reaction, should settle the issue.26  
Part VI concludes.27   
 
 17.  See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See infra notes 118–23 and accompanying text. 
 20.  See infra notes 138–66 and accompanying text.   
 21.  See infra notes 178–269 and accompanying text.   
 22.  See infra notes 28–87 and accompanying text.   
 23.  See infra notes 88–177 and accompanying text.   
 24.  See infra notes 178–269 and accompanying text.   
 25.  See infra notes 270–95 and accompanying text.   
 26.  See infra notes 299–307 and accompanying text. 
 27.  See infra notes 308–14 and accompanying text.   
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II.  A HISTORY OF THE FTAIA PRIOR TO ARBAUGH 
A.  The Extraterritorial Reach of the Sherman Act Before the Enactment of 
the FTAIA 
The Supreme Court first considered the extraterritorial reach of the 
Sherman Act28 in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., in which the 
Court held that the Sherman Act did not govern anticompetitive acts that 
took place in Panama and Costa Rica.29  The Court articulated an “almost 
universal rule . . . that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”30  
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, reasoned that to hold an actor to 
United States law rather than the laws of the place where the acts occurred 
would be unjust and would interfere with the authority of foreign sovereigns, 
contrary to international comity.31 
The strict territorial interpretation of the Sherman Act advocated by 
American Banana was subsequently softened by United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America, when the Second Circuit considered whether Congress had 
chosen to attach antitrust liability to acts performed overseas.32  The court 
first noted, in accord with American Banana’s territorial approach, that the 
words of a statute should not be read “without regard to the limitations 
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers.”33  
However, the court also recognized Congress’s power to impose liability for 
extraterritorial conduct that had consequences within the United States.34  
Ultimately, Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, created an 
effects test for determining the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act: the 
Sherman Act covered agreements that were “intended to affect imports and 
did affect them.”35   
While neither American Banana nor Alcoa directly addressed subject 
matter jurisdiction, circuit courts after Alcoa and prior to the enactment of 
 
 28.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 29.  213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
 30.  Id. at 356. 
 31.  Id.   
 32.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 33.  Id.   
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 444. 
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the FTAIA largely treated the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act 
as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.36  In 1977, the Ninth Circuit held 
that there must be an effect on commerce before federal courts can 
“legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction” under the Sherman Act.37  
Two years later, the Third Circuit stated that subject matter jurisdiction was 
at issue in determining whether the Sherman Act applied to overseas 
conduct.38  In 1980, the Seventh Circuit held that to establish subject matter 
jurisdiction, an intentional effect on American commerce must be shown.39  
The Second and Tenth Circuits also treated the extraterritorial application of 
the Sherman Act as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.40 
B.  Judicial Application of the FTAIA Prior to Arbaugh   
Following Alcoa, the effects test was applied in a variety of forms,41 
leading to unpredictability in litigation, and ultimately prompting Congress 
to resolve the inconsistent approaches through enactment of the FTAIA.42  In 
the FTAIA, Congress codified an effects test that removes foreign conduct 
from the reach of the Sherman Act unless the conduct: (1) has a direct, 
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce; 
 
 36.  See United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 951 (7th Cir. 2003), 
overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The [FTAIA] 
was enacted against a backdrop of almost 60 years of precedent which characterized the application 
of the Sherman Act to the conduct of foreign markets as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
 37.  Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 38.  Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 39.  In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253–55 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 40.  See Nat’l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing 
Timberlane and treating the threshold question as jurisdictional); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax 
Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that an effect on U.S. commerce is necessary to 
“support jurisdiction of an American court”).  The Fifth Circuit also may have considered the effects 
test as a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction.  See Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. 
Ass’n, 701 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1983) (looking at the effects test to guide courts in determining 
whether a court has “jurisdiction to entertain” a trademark action involving commerce between the 
U.S. and a foreign nation).  But cf. Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 884 n.7 
(5th Cir. 1982) (disagreeing with the Third and Seventh Circuits’ characterization of the effects test 
as a test of subject matter jurisdiction), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).   
 41.  Compare Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (applying a test that balances considerations of 
international comity with domestic effects), with Nat’l Bank of Can., 666 F.2d at 8 (applying an 
effects test similar to that of Alcoa).   
 42.  H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982) (recognizing the need for a statutory test because “courts 
differ in their expression of the proper test for determining whether United States antitrust 
jurisdiction over international transactions exists”).  
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and (2) that effect gives rise to a Sherman Act claim.43  The Supreme Court 
applied the FTAIA’s domestic effects test in two important cases prior to its 
Arbaugh decision: Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California44 and F. 
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.45 
In Hartford Fire, the Court considered a motion to dismiss46 based in 
part on a complaint filed by nineteen states and various private plaintiffs 
alleging that London-based reinsurers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 
by conspiring to refuse coverage of certain domestic policies.47  The majority 
determined that this conduct satisfied the effects test.48  The London 
reinsurers did not dispute that the Court had “a minimal basis for the 
exercise of jurisdiction,”49 but rather argued that the district court should 
have declined to exercise jurisdiction based on considerations of 
international comity.50  Justice Souter’s citation of the legislative history, as 
well as the content of Justice Scalia’s dissent, indicate that the majority 
interpreted this as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.51  However, the 
 
 43.  The text of the FTAIA in relevant part is as follows: 
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other 
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless— 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign 
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person 
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this 
title, other than this section. 
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). 
 44.  509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 45.  542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 46.  The motion to dismiss was brought under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 
12(b)(6).  See In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 471–72 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 47.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 794–95. 
 48.  Id. at 796.  Justice Souter delivered this part of the opinion, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens joining.  Id. at 766.  Justice Scalia dissented, joined by 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Id.  For an in-depth look at the dissent, see infra notes 
64–74 and accompanying text.   
 49.  Id. at 795. 
 50.  Id. at 797.  The opinion noted that in the legislative history of the FTAIA, Congress had 
expressed no view as to whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction could decline to exercise that 
jurisdiction based on international comity.  Id. at 798. 
 51.  See id. (quoting the legislative history of the FTAIA, which states in relevant part that “[i]f a 
court determines that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, [the FTAIA] would 
have no effect on the court[‘s] ability to employ notions of comity”).  The quoted legislative history 
itself cites to Timberlane, which treated the FTAIA as effecting subject matter jurisdiction.  See 
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Court declined to decide the question.52 
In Empagran, the Supreme Court held that where price fixing adversely 
affects domestic and foreign purchasers, but the foreign effect is independent 
of any domestic effect, the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception does not 
apply to claims based solely on the adverse foreign effect.53  The defendants 
moved to dismiss the case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a 
claim.54  On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the D.C. 
Circuit, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under the FTAIA.55  Although the district and circuit courts certainly 
considered the FTAIA to be an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court never clearly addressed the issue, and both sides of the 
debate have found support in Empagran’s text.56   
Between the enactment of the FTAIA and Arbaugh, circuit courts 
 
supra note 37 and accompanying text.  Additionally, in a footnote, Justice Souter quotes with 
approval a source stating that the Sherman Act is a “prime exampl[e] of the simultaneous exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction and grant of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 
n.22 (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID WESTIN & GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 542, n.5 (2d ed. 1992).  Justice Scalia’s dissent attacks an 
interpretation of the FTAIA as implicating subject matter jurisdiction, which leads to an inference 
that the majority supported this interpretation.  See infra notes 64–74 and accompanying text. 
 52.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798.  The Court instead found the substantial question to be 
whether there was a conflict between domestic and foreign law and, finding no conflict, the claims 
survived dismissal.  Id. at 798–99. 
 53.  F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).  The analysis 
focuses mainly on the “gives rise to” language of the FTAIA.  Id. at 173–74. 
 54.  Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., No. Civ.001686TFH, 2001 WL 761360, at 
*1, *4 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001) (dismissing in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 55.  Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd (Empagran II)., 417 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
 56.  A jurisdictional reading is supported by the fact that the case was brought up on a 12(b)(1) 
motion to dismiss, which was never contested by the Court, as well as the fact that the Court cited 
with approval a treatise that supports a jurisdictional interpretation.  See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 166 
(citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 273, pp. 51–52 (Supp. 
2003), which warns of the U.S. providing “worldwide subject matter jurisdiction” to foreign antitrust 
plaintiffs).  In addition, the Court looked at whether the correct scope of the FTAIA was set out in 
either Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001) or Kruman v. 
Christie’s International PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).  Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160–61.  Both 
Den Norske and Kruman treated the FTAIA as jurisdictional.  Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160–61.  See 
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431; Kruman, 284 F.3d at 390.  As for support of an elements approach, the 
Empagran opinion speaks in several places of the application of American law to foreign conduct, 
which the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010) declares is the language of merits, not subject matter jurisdiction.  See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. 
Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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continued to largely treat the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act 
as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.57  However, the circuit courts did 
not always clearly distinguish between analysis under 12(b)(1) and a 
12(b)(6) motion, and, consequently, later courts have called the reliability of 
their holdings into question.58 
C.  Dissenting Voices  
Among the broad acceptance of the FTAIA as a jurisdictional limitation, 
two dissenting opinions emerged59 that are notable for the influence of their 
reasoning on the current courts that treat the FTAIA’s requirements as 
substantive.60  In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, Justice Scalia 
dissented from a majority opinion holding a district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over a Sherman Act claim under the FTAIA.61  In United 
Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co.,62 Judge Wood, relying in part on 
Scalia’s dissent, dissented from a majority opinion holding the FTAIA was 
jurisdictional.63 
1.  Justice Scalia in Hartford Fire 
Justice Scalia interpreted the claims in Hartford Fire as raising two 
distinct questions: “whether the District Court had jurisdiction, and whether 
 
 57.  See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 122–23 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. LSL 
Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth 
Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 717 (6th Cir. 2003); United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. 
Co., 322 F.3d 942, 951–52 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319, 1329–30 
(11th Cir. 2003); Kruman, 284 F.3d at 390; Turicentro S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 
(3d Cir. 2002); Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2002); Den 
Norske, 241 F.3d at 421; Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1269.  Contemporary articles discussing these 
cases also used the language of subject matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, The 
FTAIA and Empagran: What Next?, 58 SMU L. REV. 1419 (2005).  
 58.  See, e.g., United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 962 (Wood, J., dissenting) (criticizing the courts in 
Empagran II, Kruman, and Den Norske for “focus[ing] on the merits of the FTAIA analysis rather 
than the precise procedural manner in which it was presented”).   
 59.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United 
Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 942 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 60.  See, e.g., Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 468 n.7, 469 n.8 
(3d Cir. 2011) (approving of Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire and Wood’s dissent in United 
Phosphorus). 
 61.  509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62.  322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 63.  Id. at 952.  
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the Sherman Act reaches the extraterritorial conduct alleged.”64  As to the 
question of subject matter jurisdiction, Justice Scalia believed that 
jurisdiction was established by the assertion of non-frivolous Sherman Act 
claims65 and by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives district courts jurisdiction 
over cases “arising under” federal statutes.66  Regarding the second 
question—the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act—Justice Scalia 
reasoned that it turned on whether Congress intended for the Sherman Act to 
reach the conduct at issue; if a plaintiff could not prevail on that issue, the 
court should rule that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the statute 
rather than dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction.67   
Scalia went on, however, to discuss a type of jurisdiction that was 
relevant to the FTAIA inquiry: legislative jurisdiction, also known as 
jurisdiction to prescribe,68 which refers to “the authority of a state to make its 
substantive laws applicable to particular persons and circumstances.”69  
 
 64.   509 U.S. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65.  Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (granting district courts jurisdiction to “prevent and restrain 
violations” of the Sherman Act).  In regards to frivolous claims, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998), Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that district courts have 
jurisdiction  
if the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the 
Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be 
defeated if they are given another, unless the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous  
(internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 66.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993); see 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  In 
coming to this conclusion, Justice Scalia relied on precedent from Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 
(1953).  In Lauritzen, a foreign sailor brought a Jones Act claim against a foreign shipowner, and the 
shipowner contested the jurisdiction of the district court over the claim.  Id. at 573.  The Supreme 
Court determined that the district court had jurisdiction, reasoning that 
[a]s frequently happens, a contention that there is some barrier to granting plaintiff’s 
claim is cast in terms of an exception to jurisdiction of subject matter.  A cause of action 
under our law was asserted here, and the court had power to determine whether it was or 
was not well founded in law and in fact. 
Id. at 575.  Justice Scalia also cited Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co.,358 U.S. 354, 359 
(1959) (“‘As frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the question whether 
jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question whether the complaint states a cause of 
action.’” (quoting Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951)).   
 67.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This is similar to the Court’s later 
reasoning in Morrison that the extraterritorial reach of a statute is an element of a claim and does not 
effect subject matter jurisdiction.  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).   
 68.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. IV, intro. note (1987).  The 
Restatement distinguishes between jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and 
[Vol. 41: 861, 2014] A Fundamental Disagreement 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
871 
Scalia then inquired whether international comity counseled against the 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.70  In making this determination, Justice 
Scalia applied section 403 of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law,71 which lists factors for determining whether an exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction is reasonable.72  Justice Scalia emphasized that this 
consideration of prescriptive comity was not made in order to determine 
whether the court should decline adjudicatory jurisdiction, as held in the 
majority opinion,73 but rather to determine the scope of the Sherman Act’s 
application.74 
2.  Judge Wood in United Phosphorus 
Judge Wood, in her United Phosphorus dissent, laid out four reasons for 
construing the FTAIA as imposing elements of a Sherman Act claim.75  
First, Judge Wood stated that the FTAIA’s language was not jurisdictional, 
especially when compared to the language of true jurisdiction-stripping 
statutes.76  In particular, the FTAIA’s language stating that the Sherman Act 
does not “apply” in certain circumstances was not to be equated with 
language stating that courts do not have competence to try a category of 
 
jurisdiction to enforce.  Id. at § 401; see also infra note 87. 
 70.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This is in contrast to the majority, 
which treated international comity as implicating abstention from adjudicative jurisdiction.  Id. at 
820.  However, Justice Scalia distinguished “the comity of courts, whereby judges decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere” from “‘prescriptive 
comity’: the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws,” and 
contended that lower courts applying “international comity” to the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act should be applying prescriptive comity.  Id. at 817. 
 71.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987). 
 72.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818-19. 
 73.  Id. at 798. 
 74.  Id. at 820. 
 75.  United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 954–55 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, 
J., dissenting), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 76.  Id. at 954.  Judge Wood first noted that the Supreme Court had treated statutes with 
jurisdictional language as non-jurisdictional, but had never treated a statute phrased in terms of the 
application of the statute as jurisdictional.  Id.; see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 
83 (1998) (treating the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act as non-
jurisdictional despite the statute’s use of the word jurisdiction).  Second, Judge Wood cited Czerkies 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) for the proposition that jurisdiction-
stripping rules must be expressed clearly in the language of the statute.  United Phosphorus, 322 
F.3d at 954.  However, the Supreme Court in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 
1197, 1203 (2011) calls this proposition into question, stating that “Congress, of course, need not use 
magic words in order to speak clearly” about the jurisdictional nature of a statute. 
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claims.77   
Judge Wood’s second reason was that a characterization of the FTAIA 
as limiting subject matter jurisdiction was inconsistent with the Court’s 
holding in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.78  Key to the 
analysis in Steel Co. was the long-accepted concept that “the district court 
has jurisdiction if ‘the right of the petitioners to recover under their 
complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States 
are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another.’”79  
According to Judge Wood, cases involving the FTAIA were such that 
plaintiffs would have a right to recover if there was the requisite impact on 
domestic commerce, and would be unable to recover absent those effects.80  
Third, Judge Wood was troubled by the harsh procedural consequences 
of limiting subject matter jurisdiction, particularly in light of the purposes of 
the FTAIA.81  For example, the inquiry of whether there is a “direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” effect on United States commerce 
could be complicated and thus “threaten[] to become a preliminary trial on 
the merits,” consuming significant judicial resources.82  In addition, either 
litigants or the court could raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction at 
any time in the litigation, even after extensive and costly discovery and trial 
processes.83  Furthermore, if a district court were to find valid jurisdiction, 
foreign parties would be subject to deferential appellate review of that 
finding, and appellate courts would be limited in their ability to give 
consideration to issues of international comity.84   
Finally, Judge Wood stated that a subject matter jurisdiction reading of 
the FTAIA was not consistent with the historical judicial treatment of the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.85  Judge Wood contended 
 
 77.  United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 955. 
 78.  523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 79.  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946)). 
 80.  United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 955. 
 81.  Id. at 957. 
 82.  Id.  In support of this point, Judge Wood pointed to Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of 
America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), where it took twelve years to resolve a 
jurisdictional issue.  United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 957.  In addition, Judge Wood noted that if the 
FTAIA is interpreted as jurisdictional, parties cannot stipulate the effects on U.S. commerce in order 
to resolve their dispute quickly, which also reduces the efficiency of the litigation.  Id. at 958.   
 83.  Id. at 957. 
 84.  Id. at 958–59. 
 85.  Id. at 959. 
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that the language of American Banana did not address the competence of 
courts to resolve Sherman Act claims, but rather how much conduct 
Congress intended to regulate in enacting the Sherman Act.86  Judge Wood 
similarly interpreted Alcoa as addressing whether Congress intended to 
attach liability to certain conduct, as opposed to addressing the competence 
of the court to hear the case.87   
III.  THE FTAIA AFTER ARBAUGH 
A.  The Changing Landscape of Statutory Interpretation: Arbaugh and its 
Progeny 
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,88 the first 
in a series of decisions aimed at addressing how to determine whether a 
statute imposes a jurisdictional limitation or an additional element of a 
claim.89  Arbaugh set forth a seemingly bright-line “clearly states” test,90 but 
that test was subsequently modified by later applications that made clear that 
the Court was not embracing a categorical approach.91  Along with affecting 
the characterization of a variety of statutes, Arbaugh and its progeny have 
provided the primary impetus for circuit courts deviating from the traditional 
treatment of the FTAIA as jurisdictional.92  
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 960.  According to Judge Wood, the international unpopularity of Alcoa sparked a 
slough of scholarly writing that was drawn from heavily in the creation of the Third Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law.  Id. at 960–61.  Judge Wood found it particularly significant that the 
Restatement distinguishes between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate.  Id. at 961; 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 cmt. c (differentiating between 
prescriptive jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction by stating that “[j]urisdiction to prescribe 
with respect to transnational activity depends not on a particular link, such as minimum contacts 
(‘use of the mails,’ or ‘crossing state lines’), which have been used to define ‘subject matter 
jurisdiction’ for constitutional purposes, but on a concept of reasonableness based on a number of 
factors to be considered and evaluated”).  
 88.  546 U.S. 500 (2012). 
 89.  See infra notes 93–136 and accompanying text. 
 90.  See infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text. 
 91.  See infra notes 106–36 and accompanying text. 
 92.  See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Arbaugh 
and stating that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 
(2010), provides all the guidance needed to depart from a jurisdictional interpretation of the FTAIA); 
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) (overturning prior precedent treating the FTAIA as jurisdictional in 
light of Arbaugh). 
[Vol. 41: 861, 2014] A Fundamental Disagreement 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
874 
1.  Arbaugh’s “Clearly States” Test 
In Arbaugh, the Supreme Court determined that the employee-
numerosity provision of Title VII set forth an element of a Title VII claim 
rather than a jurisdictional threshold.93  Jennifer Arbaugh, a bartender and 
waitress, brought a Title VII action charging sexual harassment against her 
employer, Y & H Corp.94  Two weeks after the jury returned a verdict for 
Arbaugh, Y & H Corp. moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, asserting for the first time in the course of litigation that 
it was not amenable to suit under Title VII because there were fewer than 
fifteen employees on its payroll.95  Believing this requirement to be 
jurisdictional, the trial court dismissed the case despite its recognition that 
doing so was both “unfair and a waste of judicial resources.”96  The Fifth 
Circuit, bound by its precedent holding the employee-numerosity provision 
to be jurisdictional, affirmed.97    
In its analysis of whether the employee-numerosity provision was 
jurisdictional, the Supreme Court acknowledged that courts, including the 
Supreme Court, had been “less than meticulous” in distinguishing between 
subject matter jurisdiction and elements of a claim for relief.98  The Court 
then created a “readily administrable bright line” test for determining 
whether a statute was jurisdictional: “If the Legislature clearly states that a 
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then 
courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with 
the issue.”99   
In applying the “clearly states” test to the Title VII statute, the Court 
noted that Title VII’s jurisdictional provision100 does not “specif[y] any 
threshold ingredient akin to 28 U.S.C. § 1332’s monetary floor,”101 and 
 
 93.  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516.  
 94.  Id. at 503–04. 
 95.  Id. at 504.  Y & H Corp. based this assertion on a provision in the definitions section of the 
Title VII statute that limits the definition of employer to “a person . . . who has fifteen or more 
employees for each working day.”  Id. at 503 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012)).  
 96.  Id. at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97.  Id. at 509. 
 98.  Id. at 511.  The Court referred to those prior decisions as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” 
that should have “no precedential effect” on the question of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. (quoting 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). 
 99.  Id. at 515–16. 
 100.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) (2012). 
 101.  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515. 
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appears in a separate provision, entitled “Definitions,” that makes no 
reference to jurisdiction.102  The Court also discussed the consequences of 
attaching a jurisdictional label to the employee-numerosity provision,103 
characterizing the likely results as “unfair and a waste of judicial 
resources.”104  Applying the bright-line test in consideration of these factors, 
the Court ultimately held that the Title VII employee-numerosity provision 
was an element of a Title VII claim and not a jurisdictional limitation.105     
2.  Refining the “Clearly States” Test 
Since ruling on Arbaugh, the Supreme Court has had several 
opportunities to apply the “clearly states” test to other statutes, although 
never specifically to the FTAIA.106  In 2007, the Supreme Court decided 
Bowles v. Russell, where it determined, in a 5–4 decision,107 that a statutory 
limitation on the length of an extension of time to file a notice of appeal was 
jurisdictional.108  Significantly, the Court made this determination despite a 
complete lack of jurisdictional language in the statute.109  Most important to 
 
 102.  Id. at 505, 515. 
 103.  Id. at 513–14.  In particular the Court noted: (1) that subject matter jurisdiction could never 
be waived or forfeited, and could be raised by the court sua sponte; (2) that if subject matter 
jurisdiction turned on contested facts, the trial judge could be authorized to review evidence in her 
determination, but if it was an element of a claim, the jury was the proper trier of fact; and (3) that 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction requires dismissal of the entire complaint, while a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim allows for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law 
claims.  Id. at 514. 
 104.  Id. at 515. 
 105.  Id. at 516. 
 106.  See infra notes 107–36 and accompanying text. 
 107.  551 U.S. 205, 206 (2007). 
 108.  Id. at 206–07. 
 109.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2012), which states:  
The district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause.  In addition, if the district court finds— 
(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive 
such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and 
(2) that no party would be prejudiced, 
the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment or 
order or within 14 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time 
for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time 
for appeal. 
Judge Wood, in her United Phosphorus dissent, stated that while there were examples of Supreme 
Court cases, such as Steel Co., treating statutes with jurisdictional language as non-jurisdictional, 
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the Court’s reasoning was the longstanding judicial treatment of statutory 
limitations on the time to appeal as jurisdictional.110    
In 2010, the Supreme Court determined in Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick 
that the Copyright Act’s registration requirement was a precondition to filing 
a claim rather than a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction.111  In its 
analysis, the Court first stated that the text of the statute did not “clearly 
state[]” that the registration requirement was jurisdictional.112  The text of the 
statute did use the word “jurisdiction,”113 but the use of the word in that 
context was to clarify that federal courts had authority to determine the issue 
of registrability when the Register was not party to the suits; the statute did 
not address the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts over claims 
involving unregistered works.114   
The Court next noted that the registration requirement was not located in 
a jurisdictional provision, and that the jurisdictional provision of the 
Copyright Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), did not condition its jurisdictional grant 
on registration.115  The Court further pointed out that 17 U.S.C. § 411 
expressly allows federal courts to adjudicate claims involving unregistered 
works in certain circumstances and stated that it would be “unusual to 
ascribe jurisdictional significance to a condition subject to these sorts of 
exceptions.”116  The Court subsequently concluded that the historical judicial 
treatment of § 411(a) as jurisdictional, though a factor in the analysis, was 
 
“there [were] no examples of the opposite approach—treating something as jurisdictional that is 
phrased in terms of the scope of application of a statute.”  United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. 
Co., 322 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, J., dissenting), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. 
Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2012).  This is likely not such an example, as the statute is 
not phrased in terms of application.  See 28 U.S.C. §2107(c). 
 110.  Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209–12.  In that discussion, the Court distinguished jurisdictional rules 
from claims-processing rules, id. at 210–11, distinguished statutory limitations imposed by Congress 
from limitations set forth in procedural rules, id. at 210–12, and distinguished Arbaugh from Bowles 
as addressing a limitation on the number of employees rather than a time limit, id. at 211.   
 111.  559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010). 
 112.  Id. at 163. 
 113.  The relevant portion of the statute states: 
The Register [of Copyrights] may, at his or her option, become a party to the [copyright 
infringement] action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim by 
entering an appearance within sixty days after such service, but the Register’s failure to 
become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine that issue. 
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012). 
 114.  Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S at 164. 
 115.  Id. at 164–65.   
 116.  Id. at 165. 
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not dispositive and that the other factors discussed demonstrated that the 
registration requirement was not jurisdictional.117 
The holding of Reed Elsevier was, on its face, surprising in light of 
Bowles, as each case involved a statute that had long been treated as 
jurisdictional by courts.118  However, the Court distinguished its holding 
from Bowles, rejecting a categorical approach to determining whether a 
statute is jurisdictional119 and stating that “Bowles stands for the proposition 
that context . . . is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as 
jurisdictional.”120  In further departure from any categorical approach, the 
Court looked to Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,121 which the Court relied on 
in Arbaugh,122 and refined the “clearly states” test by stating that “the 
jurisdictional analysis must focus on the legal character of the requirement, 
which [is] discerned by looking to the condition’s text, context, and relevant 
historical treatment.”123   
This contextual approach was reaffirmed in Henderson ex rel. 
Henderson v. Shinseki,124 in which the Court determined that, despite the 
holding of Bowles, a 120-day deadline for seeking review in Veterans Court 
was not jurisdictional.125  The Court noted that the text of the statute was not 
jurisdictional126 and was placed in a section titled “Procedure.”127  The Court 
 
 117.  Id. at 169. 
 118.  Id. at 167. 
 119.  Id.  The Court specifically rejected a categorical approach: “Bowles did not hold that any 
statutory condition devoid of an express jurisdictional label should be treated as jurisdictional simply 
because courts have long treated it as such.  Nor did it hold that all statutory conditions imposing a 
time limit should be considered jurisdictional.”  Id.  
 120.  Id. at 168.  See also Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional 
Rulings”, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 184, 200 (2011) (“Bowles thus reflects a balance between 
Arbaugh’s plain-language approach and considerations of history and precedent”). 
 121.  455 U.S. 385 (1982).  Zipes is notable for its reliance on various factors, including 
legislative history, in determining whether a statute was jurisdictional.  Id. at 393–94.   
 122.  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2012).  
 123.  Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (citing Zipes, 455 
U.S. at 393–95). 
 124.  131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011). 
 125.  Id. at 1204.  This holding was surprising because Bowles had held that a statutory limitation 
on the length of an extension of time to file a notice of appeal was jurisdictional.  See supra note 108 
and accompanying text.   
 126.  Id.  See also 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2012), which provides:  
In order to obtain review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims of a final decision 
of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, a person adversely affected by such decision shall file 
a notice of appeal with the Court within 120 days after the date on which notice of the 
decision is mailed . . . . 
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further noted the dramatic differences between civil litigation and the 
Veterans Court system created by Congress.128  However, most telling to the 
Court was Congress’s longstanding solicitude toward veterans.129 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd.130 was the Court’s first application of Arbaugh’s “clearly states” 
test to determine whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute was a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction,131 and is therefore seen by many as the most 
salient decision for analysis of the FTAIA.132  The Court in Morrison 
determined that the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934133 was a merits question rather than a question of 
jurisdiction.134  The opinion did not mention the text, structure, or judicial 
history of the Securities Exchange Act in making its decision on whether the 
statute was jurisdictional.135  Rather, the Court’s key reasoning was that “to 
ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, 
which is a merits question.”136  This reasoning has proved to be particularly 
 
 127.  Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1205 (stating that this placement suggested that the limitation was a 
claim-processing rule). 
 128.  Id. at 1205–06.  Among the most significant differences are that civil litigation is adversarial 
and plaintiffs collect evidence and bear the burden of persuasion, while Veterans Court is informal 
and non-adversarial, and the Department of Veterans Affairs must assist veterans in developing 
evidence and give veterans the benefit of any doubt.  Id. at 1206.  Moreover, in civil courts, both 
parties can appeal an adverse judgment and a final judgment can only be reopened in limited 
circumstances, while in Veterans Court a decision in the veteran’s favor is final, a veteran can have 
de novo review if unsuccessful, and a veteran can reopen a claim merely by presenting new evidence 
that is material to the case.  Id.  
 129.  Id.  The contrast between civil courts and Veterans Court is evidence of this solicitude, see 
supra note 128, and explains the difference in outcome from the Bowles decision, Henderson, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1205–06.  The Henderson Court further noted that “Congress is free to attach the conditions 
that go with the jurisdictional label to a rule that we would prefer to call a claim-processing rule,” 
and emphasized that the relevant inquiry was Congress’s intent regarding the 120-day deadline.  Id. 
at 1203. 
 130.  130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 131.  Id. at 2876–77. 
 132.  See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 133.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (prohibiting “us[ing] or employ[ing], in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”). 
 134.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 135.  Id. at 2876–77. 
 136.  Id. at 2877.  The majority opinion distinguished this merits question from subject matter 
[Vol. 41: 861, 2014] A Fundamental Disagreement 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
879 
compelling to lower courts applying the “clearly states” test to the FTAIA.137 
B.  The Development of a Circuit Split 
As lower courts have begun applying Arbaugh’s “clearly states” test to 
the FTAIA, a circuit split has developed.138  Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arbaugh, circuit courts largely treated the FTAIA as a limitation 
on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts.139  However, in 2011, the 
Third Circuit decided Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals 
Corp.,140 in which the court overturned its prior precedent141 and held that the 
FTAIA “imposes a substantive merits limitation rather than a jurisdictional 
bar.”142  In 2012, the Seventh Circuit followed suit in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. 
Agrium, Inc.,143 overturning its prior precedent144 and determining that the 
FTAIA sets forth the elements of a Sherman Act claim rather than a 
jurisdictional limitation.145 
1.  The Third Circuit in Animal Science 
The Animal Science case arose out of allegations that Chinese producers 
of magnesite146 engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy that had a significant 
economic impact in the United States.147  In the district court, the claim was 
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA, an issue 
 
jurisdiction, saying that “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to a tribunal’s power to 
hear a case” and “presents an issue quite separate from the question whether the allegations the 
plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 137.  See infra notes 191–201 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See infra notes 139–77 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text.   
 140.  654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012). 
 141.  Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2002), overruled by Animal 
Sci., 654 F.3d at 467–68; Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2000), 
overruled by Animal Sci., 654 F.3d at 467–68. 
 142.  Animal Sci., 654 F.3d at 466. 
 143.  683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 144.  United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled 
by Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845.   
 145.  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852. 
 146.  “Magnesite is mined from magnesium deposits and used, among other things, to melt steel, 
make cement, and clean wastewater.”  Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 464 n.1. 
 147.  Id. at 464. 
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that was brought up sua sponte by the district court.148  On appeal, the Third 
Circuit held that the FTAIA “imposes a substantive merits limitation rather 
than a jurisdictional bar,” vacated the district court’s judgment, and 
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its new interpretation of the 
FTAIA.149 
The Third Circuit began its analysis in Animal Science by distinguishing 
between Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to set forth elements of a 
meritorious Sherman Act claim and Congress’s Article III authority to 
define the jurisdiction of federal courts.150  In applying Arbaugh’s “clearly 
states” test to the FTAIA, the Third Circuit looked first to the text and found 
that “[t]he FTAIA neither speaks in jurisdictional terms nor refers in any 
way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”151  Rather, the court found that 
the text stated only that the Sherman Act “shall not apply” under certain 
conditions.152  The court concluded that under the Arbaugh test, the language 
of the FTAIA imposed substantive elements rather than a jurisdictional 
limitation153 and equated this to a finding that Congress had used its 
Commerce Clause authority to define elements of a Sherman Act claim 
rather than its Article III authority to define the jurisdiction of federal 
courts.154 
2.  The Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem 
The Seventh Circuit’s Minn-Chem decision overturning United 
Phosphorus was written by Judge Wood,155 who also authored the dissent in 
 
 148.  Id. at 464–65.  The case was originally dismissed without prejudice, with the instruction that 
any refiling include evidentiary proof sufficient for the court to satisfy itself as to the presence of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 465.  The plaintiffs subsequently refiled, and the district court, 
after engaging in extensive fact-finding, determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over the claim.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 466. 
 150.  Id. at 467. 
 151.  Id. at 468. 
 152.  Id.  But cf. infra note 187 and accompanying text (providing an example of how the “shall 
not apply” language can, in some cases, be jurisdictional). 
 153.  Id. at 468–69. 
 154.  Id. at 469.  The court also noted that, in keeping with the Reed Elsevier’s implication that 
context is relevant in determining whether a statute is jurisdictional, Judge Wood’s United 
Phosphorus dissent shows that the relevant context also supports a non-jurisdictional interpretation 
of the FTAIA.  Id. at 469 n.8.  
 155.  Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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United Phosphorus.156  In Minn-Chem, United States companies that 
purchased potash157 accused foreign potash producers of price-fixing in 
violation of United States antitrust laws.158  The district court denied the 
foreign defendants’ motion to dismiss, but certified an interlocutory 
appeal.159  In an en banc rehearing,160 the Seventh Circuit held that “the 
FTAIA’s criteria relate to the merits of a claim, and not to the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the court” and affirmed the district court’s determination that 
the complaint properly stated a claim under federal antitrust law.161 
In her analysis, Judge Wood stated that the Supreme Court’s Morrison 
decision provided all the guidance necessary for determining that the FTAIA 
is substantive rather than jurisdictional.162  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
the FTAIA centered on whether it was reasonable to apply the Sherman Act 
to significantly foreign conduct,163 which was the type of language that 
Morrison held to be a merits question.164  The Court further noted that the 
text of the FTAIA did not contain jurisdictional language, but rather spoke 
of conduct, which is the language of elements.165  The court also believed 
that treating the FTAIA as substantive was a more sound approach 
procedurally.166 
 
 156.  United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 953 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled 
by Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845.   
 157.  Potash is “a naturally occurring mineral used in agricultural fertilizers and other products.”  
Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 848. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  A Seventh Circuit panel initially voted to reverse the district court.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. at 852. 
 163.  Id.  For this proposition, the court also relied on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran 
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161–62 (2004). 
 164.  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852; see Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 
(2010). 
 165.  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852. 
 166.  Id.  In particular, the court stated that a defendant would have to bring a 12(b)(6) claim 
rather than a 12(b)(1) claim.  Id.  This was significant in the eyes of the court because 12(b)(1) 
claims can be brought at any time in the course of litigation, regardless of whether the parties raise 
the issue and regardless of the amount of time and expense that has been put toward the litigation.  
Id. at 853.  In contrast, a 12(b)(6) can only be brought as late as trial; however, the court opined that 
the kind of foreign connections implicated by the FTAIA would likely be easily detectable and 
parties would still have ample time to challenge claims under the FTAIA.  Id. 
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3.  Other Circuits 
In 2012, the Sixth Circuit considered a 12(b)(1) motion challenging a  
FTAIA claim in Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj.167  The court ultimately 
held that the complaint met “any threshold jurisdictional requirement 
imposed by the Sherman Act on claims involving foreign conduct.”168  In a 
footnote, the court noted the confusion among the circuits as to whether the 
FTAIA’s requirements were jurisdictional, but declined to rule on the issue 
as it had not been directly addressed by the parties.169   
The Ninth Circuit has also declined to rule on this issue since 
Arbaugh.170  In the 2008 case In re Dynamic Random Access Memory 
(DRAM) Antitrust Litigation,171 the Ninth Circuit noted the lack of clarity 
regarding whether the FTAIA was substantive or jurisdictional but did not 
rule on the issue because it was neither argued by the parties nor outcome-
determinative.172  However, not all district courts within the Ninth Circuit 
have managed to avoid the issue, and courts forced to confront it have 
reached different conclusions in their rulings.173 
Without addressing the topic directly, the Eighth Circuit has implicitly 
continued to treat the FTAIA as jurisdictional.174  The Federal Circuit, 
 
 167.  673 F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir. 2012).  The dispute involved Sherman Act claims brought by 
American air-conditioner manufacturers against foreign copper-tubing producers and their American 
subsidiaries.  Id. at 435–36. 
 168.  Id. at 440. 
 169.  Id. at 439 n.4.  The footnote suggests that, had the court ruled on the issue, it would have 
ruled the same way that Animal Science and Minn-Chem did.  In particular, the court noted that the 
language of the non-jurisdictional statute in Morrison somewhat mirrors the language of the FTAIA, 
and called Hartford Fire a “drive-by jurisdictional ruling[].”  Id.   
 170.  See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 171.  546 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008).  In this case, a British computer manufacturer filed a class 
action against American and foreign manufacturers of memory chips for price fixing.  Id. at 984.  
 172.  Id. at 983. 
 173.  See In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07–md–01819 CW, 
2010 WL 5477313, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010) (“Because Arbaugh did not clearly overrule the 
Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the FTAIA as a jurisdictional statute, and the Ninth Circuit has not 
found that it did, the Court is obliged to treat the FTAIA as jurisdictional.”); In re TFT-LCD (Flat 
Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958–59 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that the FTAIA is not 
jurisdictional) (“Although the Court does not lightly disregard the Ninth Circuit’s decision in LSL 
Biotechnologies, that decision cannot withstand Arbaugh.”); Sun Microsys. Inc. v. Hynix 
Semiconductor Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (treating the FTAIA as 
jurisdictional). 
 174.  In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 536 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming 
the lower court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
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relying in part on Judge Wood’s United Phosphorous dissent, determined 
that whether an action was within the extraterritorial reach of the Copyright 
Act was an element of a claim rather than a limitation on subject matter 
jurisdiction.175  The other circuits have not ruled on the FTAIA since 
Arbaugh, likely leaving them with precedent supporting a jurisdictional 
interpretation of the FTAIA.176  The Supreme Court has not yet intervened to 
clarify the issue, and denied writ of certiorari in Animal Science.177 
IV.  APPLYING THE “CLEARLY STATES” TEST TO THE FTAIA 
The Animal Science and Minn-Chem courts both construed Arbaugh’s 
“clearly states” test, and its subsequent applications, to compel a reading of 
the FTAIA as effecting the merits of a claim rather than a court’s ability to 
hear the case.178  In addition, some courts that have declined to rule on the 
issue have noted that Arbaugh likely impacts the characterization of the 
FTAIA, and suggested that, if not for contrary circuit precedent, they would 
treat the FTAIA as imposing merits of a Sherman Act claim.179  Particularly 
after Morrison, many feel that the modern interpretation of the FTAIA is the 
correct one, and that the FTAIA will ultimately be treated as substantive 
rather than jurisdictional.180  Although some aspects of the “clearly states” 
test support the modern elements interpretation of the FTAIA,181 there are 
also compelling and often overlooked reasons to believe that the Arbaugh 
test supports a jurisdictional reading of the FTAIA.182 
A.  The Likely Direction of the Courts: An Element Interpretation of the 
FTAIA 
Both the Third and Seventh Circuits, in determining that the FTAIA 
 
 175.  Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1365 n.3, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 176.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 177.  China Minmetals Corp. v. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) (denying 
certiorari). 
 178.  See supra notes 150–66 and accompanying text. 
 179.  See supra notes 167–77 and accompanying text. 
 180.  See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 120, at 188 (arguing that Morrison establishes that the 
extraterritorial application of American statutory law, including which foreign harms American law 
protects against, is “explicitly defined as a merits issue[,] and courts of appeals should follow that 
understanding”). 
 181.  See infra notes 183–210 and accompanying text. 
 182.  See infra notes 211–69 and accompanying text. 
[Vol. 41: 861, 2014] A Fundamental Disagreement 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
884 
imposed elements of a Sherman Act claim, looked to the text of the 
FTAIA.183  The Seventh Circuit also looked to the judicial treatment of 
similar provisions, namely in Morrison, and to the procedural consequences 
of a jurisdictional interpretation of the FTAIA.184    
1.  The Language and Structure of the FTAIA 
Arbaugh and its progeny consistently looked to two factors: the 
language and structure of the statute.185  In the case of the FTAIA, there is no 
clear jurisdictional language in the statute186—the “shall not apply” language 
of the FTAIA is ambiguous, having been used in both substantive and 
jurisdictional provisions.187  Additionally, the FTAIA is separate from the 
Sherman Act’s jurisdiction-granting provision.188  While these factors alone 
are insufficient to determine the nature of the statute under Arbaugh’s 
“clearly states” test,189 circuit courts have found these factors to weigh 
 
 183.  See supra notes 151–53, 165 and accompanying text. 
 184.  See supra notes 162–64, 166 and accompanying text.  The Third Circuit addressed these 
issues indirectly by stating in a footnote its agreement with Judge Wood’s United Phosphorus 
dissent.  See supra note 154.  
 185.  See supra notes 102, 109, 112–15 and accompanying text.  But cf. note 135 and 
accompanying text. 
 186.  See supra note 43.  Litigants have argued that the FTAIA indeed does contain jurisdictional 
language in the form of a reference to and modification of a jurisdictional provision.  See Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari of Sinosteel Corp., Sinosteel Trading Co., Ltd. and Liaoning Mayi Metals & 
Minerals Co., Ltd. at 15–16, China Minmetals Corp. v. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1744 
(2012) (No. 11-847), 2012 WL 73207.  Litigants argue that because the FTAIA states that “Sections 
1 to 7 of this title shall not apply,” and that includes section 4 (the jurisdiction-granting section of the 
FTAIA), jurisdiction only applies if there is the requisite effect on commerce and therefore there is 
jurisdictional language in the statute.  Id.  However, this is far from clear language—at best creating 
ambiguity—and also leads to the difficult result that if the § 4 jurisdiction-granting provision does 
not apply without the requisite effect on commerce, nor does § 7, which provides the definition of a 
person.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).  A more reasonable reading seems to be that Congress was using 
the phrase “Sections 1 to 7 of this title” as shorthand for the Sherman Act.   
 187.  See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s “Jurisdictional” Reach Abroad, (Univ. of Iowa Coll. 
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-41, 2011) (arguing that the “shall not apply” language 
of the FTAIA can be interpreted either way), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1962370.  For an 
example of the “shall not apply” language being used as a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction, 
see Campbell v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (D. Mass. 2004) (stating that the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), “shall not apply” to claims for assault and battery, and 
therefore if a plaintiff’s claim arises under § 2680(h), the court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear it). 
 188.  See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (granting federal courts jurisdiction to prevent violations of the Sherman 
Act). 
 189.  See supra notes 106–17; see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 
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toward a reading of the FTAIA as an element of a Sherman Act claim.190 
2.  Treatment of Similar Provisions: Morrison 
The decisions following Arbaugh, particularly Bowles and Morrison, 
also looked at the treatment of similar provisions in determining the 
jurisdictional nature of a statute.191  Because the FTAIA involves the 
extraterritorial application of United States statutory law,192 many courts 
have looked to Morrison, which dealt with the nature of a statute in the 
context of its extraterritorial application,193 in their consideration of the 
FTAIA.194  In Morrison, the Court overruled circuit precedent that treated 
the extraterritorial application of statutes as an issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction,195 and declared that the extraterritorial application of a statute is 
a merits question.196  While Morrison provided the clearest statement of the 
Court’s approach to the extraterritorial application of statutes, it was not a 
new canon of statutory interpretation; the Court had previously held that any 
question that did not go to the power of the courts to hear a case was a 
question of merits and not of jurisdiction.197   
The key language of Morrison states that “to ask what conduct § 10(b) 
reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits 
 
1203 (2011) (stating that “Congress, of course, need not use magic words in order to speak clearly” 
about the jurisdictional nature of a statute). 
 190.  See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 468–69; Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 
845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012).   
 191.  See supra notes 106–10, 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See supra note 43.  
 193.  See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
 194.  See Animal Sci. Prods., 654 F.3d at 466 (noting Morrison’s holding that the extraterritorial 
reach of a statute presented a merits issue); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 851–52 (stating that Morrison 
provides all the guidance needed regarding the extraterritorial application of a statute). 
 195.  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).  Specifically, the Court 
overruled Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), but noted that “[t]he Second 
Circuit is hardly alone in taking this position.”  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (citing as examples In 
re CP Ships Ltd. Securities Litigation, 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009) and Continental Grain 
(Australia.) Pty.. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979)). 
 196.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 197.  See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 596 (2009) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction refers 
only to the power of a court to hear a case); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 
628 (2009) (noting a conflation of jurisdictional issues with the merits of a claim); United States v. 
Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 915 (2009) (same). 
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question.”198  The FTAIA fits neatly into this formula; to ask what conduct 
the FTAIA reaches—in other words, whether the conduct has a direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce 
and gives rise to a Sherman Act claim199—is to ask what conduct the FTAIA 
prohibits, which is a merits question.200  This reasoning was instrumental in 
Minn-Chem, in which the court stated that it could “see no way to 
distinguish this case from Morrison.”201 
3.  Procedural Consequences  
The Court in Arbaugh also considered the procedural consequences of 
attaching a jurisdictional label to a statute.202  The Seventh Circuit has 
argued that an elements interpretation of the FTAIA is a stronger approach 
procedurally than the jurisdictional approach.203  First, applying the FTAIA’s 
 
 198.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.  
 199.  See supra note 43. 
 200.  See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012).  The petition for 
certiorari from the Animal Science case questioned this reasoning, stating:   
[T]o ask what conduct the FTAIA reaches is not to ask what conduct the FTAIA 
prohibits.  Unlike Section 10(b)’s antifraud provision, the FTAIA does not prohibit any 
conduct.  Rather, the FTAIA removes from federal courts the power to adjudicate 
whether foreign conduct that might otherwise be actionable under the Sherman Act 
violates the antitrust laws . . . .  Therefore, to continue the analogy, to ask what conduct 
the FTAIA reaches is to ask what foreign conduct is outside the reach of the Sherman Act 
and beyond the adjudicatory powers of the federal courts, which is not a merits question 
but one of subject matter jurisdiction.   
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari of Sinosteel Corp., Sinosteel Trading Co., Ltd. and Liaoning Mayi 
Metals & Minerals Co., Ltd. at 14–15, China Minmetals Corp. v. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1744 (2012) (No. 11-874), 2012 WL 73207.  This argument is based on the assumption that the 
FTAIA is jurisdictional, and therefore does not pose a challenge to applying the Morrison reasoning.  
However, the structure of this argument raises the question whether the Morrison reasoning similarly 
rests on the assumption that the FTAIA prohibits conduct, rather than removing certain conduct from 
the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. 
 201.  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 852.  Although Judge Wood’s United Phosphorus dissent relied 
significantly on Steel Co., her majority opinion in Minn-Chem mentioned it only in passing, 683 
F.3d at 852, likely because Morrison provided such strong support for her position.  However, if 
Congress’s intent was for the FTAIA to go to jurisdiction and not affect the merits of a Sherman Act 
claim, see infra notes 216–249 and accompanying text, the Steel Co. argument may lose its force.  If 
Congress deemed the FTAIA to be jurisdictional, the right of plaintiffs to recover is based on the 
actual Sherman Act claim; the domestic effects are examined solely for the purpose of establishing 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Cf. supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 202.  See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
 203.  United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, 
J., dissenting). 
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effects test can be complicated, and therefore does not lend itself to quick 
resolution.204  In contrast, if the effects test is an element of a claim, the court 
can determine antitrust cases on a more straightforward issue, such as 
market power, and avoid engaging in the domestic effects analysis.205  
Additionally, subject matter jurisdiction must be present at all times and 
therefore can be raised at any time in the litigation, including sua sponte by 
the court, regardless of the amount of time and resources already invested in 
the process.206  In contrast, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim can 
only be brought as late as trial.207 
While these procedural outcomes weigh toward an elements reading of 
the FTAIA, use of the 12(b)(6) motion also makes it less likely that 
defendants will be able to receive dismissals.208  Critics of the substantive 
approach thus argue that use of the 12(b)(6) motion expands the reach of the 
Sherman Act, an outcome that is incongruent with the purpose of the FTAIA 
as defined by the Supreme Court in Empagran.209  This has possible 
 
 204.  Id.  
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 853.  In one of the most egregious examples, a court took twelve 
years to resolve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in an international antitrust case.  See United 
Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 957 (discussing the twelve-year procedural history of Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.). 
 207.  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 853. 
 208.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 3–4 (“Prior to trial allegations and evidence are typically 
construed against the movant, while in the 12(b)(1) proceeding the judge acts as a neutral fact finder.  
Further, to the extent that the 12(b)(6) interpretation protracts the litigation, perhaps delaying the 
issue of extraterritorial reach until summary judgment or even the trial stage, plaintiffs will be able 
to obtain more favorable settlements.”).  Many of the procedural consequences tend to favor 
plaintiffs.  First, in a 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over the action and the complaint’s allegations are not given any 
presumption of truth.  United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 
2003), overruled on other grounds, Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845.  A 12(b)(6) motion, in contrast, only 
permits facial attacks on the complaint, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, and requires the 
court to construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  See 
Hovenkamp, supra note 194.  However, the heightened pleading standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), have arguably 
minimized these differences.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 3; see also Howard M. 
Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 664–65 (2005) (“[T]o the extent judges 
have become freer in resolving factual disputes, both in granting summary judgment and in 
reviewing jury findings, the procedural consequences of the jurisdiction/merits confusion may 
become less practically significant.”). 
 209.  See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004) (“[T]he 
FTAIA’s language and history suggest that Congress designed the Act to clarify, perhaps to limit, 
but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign 
commerce.”).   
[Vol. 41: 861, 2014] A Fundamental Disagreement 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
888 
implications for international comity as well; as the Court in Empagran 
noted, the technical nature of international antitrust cases could lead to 
lengthy proceedings “where procedural costs and delays could themselves 
threaten interference with a foreign nation’s ability to maintain the integrity 
of its own antitrust enforcement system.”210  Therefore, the procedural 
consequences do not conclusively recommend one approach over another. 
B.  A Case for a Jurisdictional Interpretation of the FTAIA 
Arbaugh’s “clearly states” test specifies that the legislature must clearly 
state the jurisdictional nature of the statute.211  In Henderson, the Supreme 
Court further clarified that the purpose of the “clearly states” test is to 
“capture Congress’s likely intent,” stating that “[u]nder Arbaugh, we look to 
see if there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be 
‘jurisdictional.’”212  While the Third and Seventh Circuits have mainly 
looked to the text of the statute to find Congress’s intent,213 the text is not the 
only place from which to discern congressional intent; the legislative history 
of the FTAIA and Congress’s reaction to Morrison, insofar as they reveal 
the clear intent of Congress, are relevant to the analysis.214  Along with 
congressional intent, the treatment of similar effects tests and the historical 
judicial treatment of the FTAIA also support the traditional interpretation of 
the FTAIA.215  
1.  Congressional Intent 
a.  Legislative History 
By far, the strongest argument for a jurisdictional reading of the FTAIA 
 
 210.  Id. at 168–69. 
 211.  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). 
 212.  Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16).   
 213.  See supra notes 150–66 and accompanying text. 
 214.  See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1982) (using legislative 
history to determine the nature of a statute).  The Arbaugh Court relied on Zipes in its analysis.  
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.  Courts generally do not look to the legislative history if the statutory text 
is clear.  See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984).  In the case of the FTAIA, the language of the statute is ambiguous.  See supra note 187 and 
accompanying text.   
 215.  See infra notes 216–69 and accompanying text. 
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is found in its legislative history.216  However, the legislative history has 
been given short shrift by circuit courts treating the FTAIA as imposing 
elements of a Sherman Act claim.217  The most powerful pro-jurisdiction 
statement in the legislative history of the FTAIA comes in a section entitled 
“Effect of Legislation and Current Law.”218  It states:   
It is the intent of the sponsors of the legislation and the committee 
to address only the subject matter jurisdiction of United States 
antitrust law in this legislation.  H.R. 5235 does not affect the legal 
standards for determining whether conduct violates the antitrust 
laws, and thus the substantial antitrust issues on the merits of a 
claim would remain unchanged.219 
This statement is particularly significant because not only does it use the 
word jurisdiction, which—admittedly—”is a word of many, too many, 
 
 216.  See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487. 
 217.  See United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Wood, J., dissenting) (“While it is true that the House Report on the FTAIA uses the word 
‘jurisdiction’ with some regularity, it also speaks repeatedly about whether U.S. antitrust law should 
be applied to particular transactions.  . . . It is therefore impossible to draw any firm conclusions 
from that brief document that will assist us in resolving the issue presently before us.”); see also 
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 2012) (overruling prior precedent with 
the brief statement that the earlier court had relied in part on legislative history); Animal Sci. Prods., 
Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) 
(overturning precedent and treating the FTAIA as an element of a Sherman Act claim with no 
mention of the legislative history); Patrick G. Secor, Comment, Antitrust Law: Jurisdictional 
Review—Analysis of Sherman Act Claims Against Foreign Defendants Requires a Merits-Based 
Review—Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011), 35 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 245, 251–52 (2012) (“In deciding that the plain language of the 
FTAIA did not strip jurisdiction from the federal courts, the Third Circuit failed to address the 
conflicting legislative history of the Act. . . .  The Third Circuit’s reading of Arbaugh to apply only 
to the exact text of legislation fails to address the contradiction between its own finding and the clear 
legislative intent.”). 
 218.  H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498. 
 219.  Id. (emphasis added).  This is not an isolated statement; elsewhere, the legislative history 
again states 
[i]n providing that the federal courts may assert the jurisdiction of the United States 
antitrust laws if conduct affects [U.S. commerce], the committee does not intend to alter 
existing concepts of antitrust injury or antitrust standing.  This bill only establishes the 
standards necessary for assertion of United States antitrust jurisdiction.  The substantive 
antitrust issues on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim would remain unchanged. 
Id. at 11.  The legislative history uses the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” four times, e.g., id. at 
13, and also speaks of “effects that are necessary to create jurisdiction under the antitrust laws” of 
the United States, e.g., id. at 5.   
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meanings,”220 but it also specifically refers to subject matter jurisdiction, 
which is a term of art with which Congress is assumed to be familiar.221  
Furthermore, it shows that Congress understood the consequences of such a 
jurisdictional reading by stating the result: the merits of a Sherman Act 
claim would remain unchanged.222  The House Report also states that 
satisfaction of the effects test would “serve as the predicate for antitrust 
jurisdiction.”223  Therefore, the legislative history strongly suggests that 
Congress, the body with the power to divest federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction,224 intended for the FTAIA to be a limitation on subject matter 
jurisdiction.225  
Critics argue that if Congress was so clear about its intent, it would have 
spoken clearly in the text.226  However, there are at least two reasons why 
Congress may not have used clearer jurisdiction-stripping language in the 
text.227  First, at the time the FTAIA was enacted, Congress did not have the 
benefit of the Arbaugh decision and arguably was not on notice that the 
clarity of its jurisdictional language would be so significant.228  Second, it is 
 
 220.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v. 
Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 221.  See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“[W]here Congress borrows 
terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it 
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the 
body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind 
unless otherwise instructed.”).  The specific use of the term “subject matter jurisdiction” also calls 
into question Judge Wood’s claim that Congress was actually addressing prescriptive jurisdiction.  
See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, J., 
dissenting), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 222.  H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498.   
 223.  Id. at 11. 
 224.  See, e.g., Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452–53 (2004); Argentine Republic v. Amerada 
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989) (“We start from the settled proposition that the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is determined by Congress in the exact degrees 
and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 225.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 6 (“The most reasonable interpretation of these 
statements is that Congress clearly intended for the FTAIA to limit subject matter jurisdiction, but 
that it was less clear when it actually drafted the FTAIA, whose ‘shall not apply’ language can be 
interpreted either way.”).  
 226.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (noting the 
danger that relying on legislative materials will incentivize manipulation of the legislative history to 
gain results that were not achieved in the statutory text).   
 227.  See infra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
 228.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 6 (“Of course, at the time Congress drafted the FTAIA it 
did not yet have the benefit of the Arbaugh holding to the effect that a statute’s ‘jurisdictional’ 
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a rule of statutory construction that if Congress, in enacting a statute, means 
to change the treatment of a judicially created concept, it must be specific 
about that intent.229  Prior to the enactment of the FTAIA, the extraterritorial 
reach of the Sherman Act was almost universally treated as an issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction.230  Therefore, it would have been reasonable for 
Congress to assume that the effects test would continue to function as a 
limitation on jurisdiction and to see no need to be clear in this regard.231 
Another criticism of reliance on the legislative history of the FTAIA is 
the existence of language in the legislative history that speaks of whether 
United States antitrust law applies to particular transactions.232  This being 
the language of merits, according to Morrison,233 it is used to support the 
notion that the legislature was not clear about its use of the term 
jurisdiction.234  However, Congress does have the power to make the 
extraterritorial application of United States law to particular conduct a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction235—the relevant question is whether it 
has done so in the case of the FTAIA. 
 
conduct must be unambiguous.  Congress at the time was far less careful about how it drafted 
jurisdictional language.”).  Additionally, even now, “magic words” are not necessary for Congress to 
express intent to limit subject matter jurisdiction.  Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. 
Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011). 
 229.  See Midatlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); see also 
Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1203 (“When ‘a long line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by 
Congress’ . . . has treated a similar requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’ we will presume that Congress 
intended to follow that course.” (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs and Trainmen 
Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 597 (2009))).   
 230.  See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 231.  The only clear language necessary under this canon of construction would be if Congress 
wanted the FTAIA to be substantive—and this clarity is conspicuously absent.  See supra note 43. 
 232.  See United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Wood, J. dissenting), overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2847 
(stating that the purpose of the FTAIA is to “make explicit” the Sherman Act’s “application only to 
conduct” that satisfies the effects test).   
 233.  See infra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 234.  See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 961–62. 
 235.  One example of this is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 
2891 (1976).  See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434– 35 
(1989) (“[T]he FSIA ‘must be applied by the district courts in every action against a foreign 
sovereign, since subject-matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the 
specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.’” (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 498 (1983))).  Another example, as discussed in the next section, is 
Congress’s response to Morrison.  See infra notes 236–49 and accompanying text. 
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b.  Congress’s Response to Morrison 
While it is true that Morrison treated the extraterritorial application of 
United States law as a question of merits,236 it is equally true that in cases 
following Arbaugh, the Supreme Court has rejected a categorical approach 
to determining the jurisdictional nature of a statute.237  Therefore, the fact 
that the FTAIA speaks to the application of United States law to particular 
conduct does not make Morrison conclusive in the analysis.238  Moreover, 
Congress’s reaction to Morrison further calls into question its use in an 
FTAIA analysis.239  
Congress responded to Morrison by drafting the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),240 which 
“was worded in terms of the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.”241  
Specifically, the “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction” section of the Act states that 
courts “shall have jurisdiction” in actions involving extraterritorial conduct 
that has a “foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”242  
Congress’s adoption of this jurisdictional language was particularly 
surprising as it was used despite the clear holding of Morrison that the 
extraterritorial reach of a statute is not an issue of subject matter 
 
 236.  See infra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 237.  See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text. 
 238.  But cf. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Morrison, we believe, provides all the guidance we need to conclude that, like § 
10(b) of the Exchange Act, the FTAIA sets forth an element of an antitrust claim, not a jurisdictional 
limit on the power of the federal courts.”). 
 239.  See infra notes 241–49 and accompanying text. 
 240.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 241.  Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial 
Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INTL. L. 1, 15 (2011).   
 242.  The relevant text is as follows: 
(b) Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory 
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the 
[Securities and Exchange] Commission or the United States alleging a violation of 
the antifraud provisions of this chapter involving— 
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in 
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside 
the United States and involves only foreign investors; or 
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable 
substantial effect within the United States. 
15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b) (2012).  This “foreseeable substantial effect” test is similar to the FTAIA’s 
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” standard.  See supra note 43.  
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jurisdiction,243 as well as the Court’s similar 2009 decision in Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen General 
Committee of Adjustment.244  
Congress’s adoption of this language, while surprising, was almost 
certainly intentional.245  In addition to Congress’s knowledge of Union 
Pacific and Morrison, a month and a half before the House passed the 
original bill, the SEC and the Solicitor General told Congress that 
extraterritoriality was not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.246  In 
addition, the final day of the Dodd-Frank House–Senate Conference was the 
same day that Morrison was decided and the Senate adopted the previously 
drafted jurisdictional provision after learning of Morrison’s holding.247  
Therefore, Congress, even with notice of the judicial treatment of 
extraterritorial application of statutes as going to the merits and with the 
benefit of Arbaugh’s “clearly states” test, used clear jurisdictional language 
in the Dodd-Frank Act to “turn[] the extraterritorial issue into a question of 
jurisdiction rather than the merits.”248  This raises the question of whether 
Congress’s reaction to Morrison in the Dodd-Frank Act reveals a 
fundamental difference in the way that the Supreme Court and Congress 
view the extraterritorial application of United States law.249 
 
 243.  See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).   
 244.  558 U.S. 67 (2009); see also Painter et al., supra note 241, at 21.  Indeed, as early as 1959, 
the Supreme Court had treated extraterritoriality as a merits question.  Id. at 3; see Romero v. Int’l 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359, 381–84 (1959).  Making the extraterritorial reach of a 
statute an issue of subject matter jurisdiction is well within Congress’s power, as recognized by 
Arbaugh.  See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 n.11 (2006) (“Congress has exercised its 
prerogative to restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts based on a wide variety 
of factors, some of them also relevant to the merits of a case.”). 
 245.  See Painter et al., supra note 241, at 25. 
 246.  See Painter et al., supra note 241, at 17. 
 247.  See Painter et al., supra note 241, at 25 (“Under these circumstances, Congress’s intent to 
override Morrison in SEC and DOJ actions (even if less than artfully worded) is clear and is likely to 
carry substantial weight.”). 
 248.  See Painter et al., supra note 241, at 21.  The SEC, which was an influential part of the 
formation of the Dodd-Frank Act, see infra note 250, agrees with this characterization, see Study on 
Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,822, 66,823 n.1 (Oct. 29, 2010) (“[T]he 
Dodd-Frank Act largely codified the long-standing appellate court interpretation of the law that had 
existed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison by setting forth an expansive conducts and 
effects test, and providing that the inquiry is one of subject matter jurisdiction.”).  
 249.  See Painter et al., supra note 241, at 21 (stating that Congress’s language in the Dodd-Frank 
Act “might reflect a difficult point of law, on which the courts have reached contrary conclusions”). 
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2.  Treatment of Similar Provisions: The Effects Test 
Congress’s reaction to Morrison in the Dodd-Frank Act, in reinstating 
the jurisdictional limitation previously used by circuit courts, arguably also 
reinstates the effects test used by those courts, which bears resemblance to 
the effects test in the FTAIA.250  This is not the only effects test that 
Congress has deemed jurisdictional.251  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (FSIA) employs an effects test very similar to that of the FTAIA,252 and 
Congress and the Supreme Court have consistently treated that test as a 
limitation on subject matter jurisdiction.253  The FSIA initially removes all 
foreign sovereigns from the jurisdiction of United States courts, and then 
brings them back within the jurisdiction of the courts if one of several 
statutory exceptions applies.254  The exception most closely tracking the 
language of the FTAIA is the commercial activity exception of 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(2), which provides that foreign sovereigns are not immune for 
commercial activity that has a “direct effect” in the United States.255  The 
similarities between the two tests led the Ninth Circuit to adopt the FSIA’s 
definition of “direct” in the FTAIA’s domestic effects inquiry.256 
 
 250.  The Dodd-Frank Act grants jurisdiction over “conduct occurring outside the United States 
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”  See supra note 242.  The SEC 
attorneys who “provid[ed] technical assistance to members of Congress that included, among other 
things, explaining the provisions’ intended effect of codifying the courts of appeals’ approach to 
extraterritoriality with respect to SEC and DOJ enforcement actions” intended to return to the 
previous jurisdictional effects test, and thus influenced the jurisdictional language.  Painter et al., 
supra note 241, at 22 n.89.   
 251.  See infra notes 257–60 and accompanying text. 
 252.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
 253.  Congress’s jurisdictional language is clear in the statutory text, which states that “a foreign 
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except 
as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”  28 U.S.C. § 1604.  This jurisdictional 
language has been respected and upheld by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 
U.S. 305, 324–25 (2010) (holding that where the FSIA did not govern a claim of immunity, the 
FSIA did not deprive a court of subject-matter jurisdiction).   
 254.  See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610–11 (1992).   
 255.  Id. at 611; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 256.  See United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (following the 
Supreme Court’s precedent in Republic of Argentina that “an effect is ‘direct’ if it follows as an 
immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity”).  But cf. Minn-Chem., Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 
F.3d 845, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit definition in favor of the DOJ’s 
definition of direct as “a reasonably proximate causal nexus”) (quoting Makan Delrahim, Drawing 
the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to 
Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 415, 430 (2005) (remarks of the Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General)).  
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Another effects test that is closely tied both to Morrison and the FTAIA 
is that of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).257  
As the Second Circuit noted, “precedents concerning subject matter 
jurisdiction for international securities transactions and antitrust matters” 
guide the extraterritorial application of RICO.258  Prior to Morrison, the 
majority of courts applied the same effects test used for section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act to RICO claims to determine whether subject 
matter jurisdiction existed.259  That test provided for subject matter 
jurisdiction “if conduct material to the completion of the racketeering occurs 
in the United States, or if significant effects of the racketeering are felt [in 
the United States].”260 
Within a few months of the Morrison decision, the Second Circuit 
abrogated its prior use of the effects test,261 holding that the proper question 
is whether “a United States federal court can provide relief, not . . . whether 
the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.”262  Other 
courts have since held that, in light of Morrison, the effects test in regards to 
RICO is no longer good law.263  Nevertheless, the Dodd-Frank Act’s return 
to the pre-Morrison subject matter jurisdiction effects test may call these 
rulings into question.264  The pre-Morrison jurisdictional treatment of the 
RICO effects test together with the similar treatment of the FSIA’s effects 
tests gives rise to a colorable claim that Congress believes effects tests to be 
jurisdictional in nature.265  
3.  Historical Judicial Treatment 
The historical judicial treatment of a statute is an additional 
 
 257.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012). 
 258.  N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996), abrogated on other 
grounds by Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 259.  See R. Davis Mello, Note, Life After Morrison: Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1385, 1399 (2011). 
 260.  See Mello, supra note 259, at 1399 (alteration in original) (quoting Liquidation Comm’n of 
Banco Intercont’l, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 261.  See N. S. Fin. Corp., 100 F.3d 1046. 
 262.  Norex Petrol. Ltd., 631 F.3d at 31. 
 263.  See Mello, supra note 259, at 1403–04. 
 264.  See supra notes 241–49 and accompanying text. 
 265.  While this development weighs in favor of a jurisdictional reading of the FTAIA, it is not 
dispositive, as the Court has rejected a categorical approach to determining the nature of statutes.  
See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text. 
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consideration to which courts have given varying weight when determining 
whether a statute is jurisdictional.266  Here, the factor is far from dispositive.  
Certainly the clear trend in the circuit courts prior to Arbaugh was to treat 
the FTAIA as jurisdictional.267  However, later circuit decisions have 
questioned the rigor of the analyses in these cases.268  Additionally, even 
though the Courts in Hartford Fire and Empagran considered FTAIA issues 
brought on a 12(b)(1) motion, neither of the opinions addressed the 
jurisdictional issue directly, and both opinions contained language that, 
under Morrison, would go to the merits of a Sherman Act claim.269  
Therefore the historical judicial treatment of the FTAIA, while a factor to be 
considered, is not particularly helpful in determining the legal character of 
the FTAIA. 
V.  THE CONSEQUENCES AND RESOLUTION OF THE COMPETING APPROACHES 
TO THE FTAIA 
The clear trend of the circuit courts in applying Arbaugh to the FTAIA 
is to treat the FTAIA as a substantive limitation.270  The Third and Seventh 
Circuits have based this decision primarily on the text and location of the 
statutory provision and on Morrison’s characterization of extraterritorial 
application as a merits question.271  However, there are also compelling 
reasons to continue treating the FTAIA as a jurisdictional limitation, 
particularly Congress’s seemingly clear intent.272  The approach that carries 
the day will have consequences that impact civil procedure, international 
 
 266.  While this factor was a significant part of the decision in Bowles, see supra note 110 and 
accompanying text, it was not dispositive in Reed Elsevier, see supra note 117 and accompanying 
text. 
 267.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 268.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 269.  See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text.  The same is true of Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act prior to the enactment of the 
FTAIA.  See supra notes 28–36 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 271.  See supra notes 150–66 and accompanying text.  Application of the “clearly states” test 
bears this out; these factors provide the best support for the position, whereas the procedural 
consequences are less compelling.  See supra notes 183–210 and accompanying text. 
 272.  See supra notes 193–230.  The nature of the effects test and the relevant historical treatment, 
while relevant, are less compelling than the congressional intent because the purpose of the “clearly 
states” test is to discern the intent of Congress, and Congress has the right to make any statutory 
limitation jurisdictional.  See supra notes 250–69, and accompanying text; see infra note 314. 
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comity, and the jurisdictional designation of other related statutes.273  
Although the uncertainty as to the nature of the FTAIA has arisen in the 
district and circuit courts, the resolution of the issue is ultimately beyond the 
purview of the lower courts.274   
A.  Practical Consequences  
1.  Procedure 
The competing interpretations of the FTAIA are not merely theoretical; 
they have real procedural consequences.275  The primary procedural 
consequence of a substantive interpretation of the FTAIA is that plaintiffs 
basing their claims on foreign conduct will have to plead and prove an 
additional element in Sherman Act cases.276  Additionally, the interpretation 
chosen determines who the decision-maker will be: the court decides 
whether there is subject matter jurisdiction, while whether an element of a 
claim has been satisfied is considered by the jury.277  A third procedural 
difference between the two approaches is that parties who want to contest an 
antitrust suit will have to file either a 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) motion.278  The 
 
 273.  See infra notes 275–97 and accompanying text. 
 274.  See infra notes 302–14 and accompanying text. 
 275.  See, e.g., Minn-Chem., Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852–53 (7th Cir. 2012) (“This is 
not a picky point that is of interest only to procedure buffs.  Rather, this distinction affects how 
disputed facts are handled, and it determines when a party may raise the point.”).  In Arbaugh, the 
Court looked to the procedural consequences of attaching a jurisdictional label to a statute in its 
analysis.  See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.  This factor was also given consideration 
both in Judge Wood’s United Phosphorus dissent, see supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text, 
and her subsequent majority opinion in Minn-Chem, see supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 276.  See Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 285, 330 (stating that while traditional Sherman Act claims 
have two elements—an agreement and a restraint of trade—the FTAIA would add a third element 
regarding the domestic effect of the conduct).   
 277.  Id. 
 278.  See Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, supra note 208, at 662–69.  In a 12(b)(1) motion, 
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the 
action and the complaint’s allegations are given any presumption of truth.  United Phosphorus Ltd. 
v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Minn-Chem, 
Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).  If the attack is factual rather than facial, the court 
is allowed to weigh evidence beyond the complaint in making its determination.  Id.  A 12(b)(6) 
motion, in contrast, permits only facial attacks on the complaint, shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendant, and requires the court to construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 853.  In addition, a dismissal for lack of subject 
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12(b)(6) is generally acknowledged to be more favorable to plaintiffs,279 
increasing the likelihood that defendants will settle.280  However, the 
heightened pleading standards of Twombly281 and Iqbal282 have arguably 
minimized these differences.283  Additionally, the pre-trial dismissal is not 
typically dependent on the distinction between jurisdiction and merits.284  
Therefore, these procedural differences, while significant, are only 
occasionally outcome-determinative.285 
2.  International Comity 
The concern of international comity was of particular importance in 
Hartford Fire286 and Empagran.287  In Hartford Fire, Justice Souter stated 
that “concerns of comity come into play, if at all, only after a court has 
determined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act 
 
matter jurisdiction is usually without prejudice, but requires the dismissal of the entire claim, while a 
dismissal on the merits precludes plaintiffs from re-filing the case, but the court can still exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over pendant claims.  See Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, 
Transnational Dealings—Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46 INT’L LAW. 829, 839 (2012). 
 279.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 3–4 (“Prior to trial allegations and evidence are typically 
construed against the movant, while in the 12(b)(1) proceeding the judge acts as a neutral fact finder. 
Further, to the extent that the 12(b)(6) interpretation protracts the litigation, perhaps delaying the 
issue of extraterritorial reach until summary judgment or even the trial stage, plaintiffs will be able 
to obtain more favorable settlements.”); see also Steinberg, supra note 278, at 839 (“With the 
exception of potential claim preclusion, the characterization of an issue as merit-based appears to 
favor plaintiffs.  When an issue is deemed a merits question there is a limited time for challenges by 
defendants, no independent judicial obligation to ensure that merit requirements are met, and a jury 
to resolve disputes concerning contested facts.”). 
 280.  See Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really Want to 
Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3, 25–26 (2012) (explaining that under a 12(b)(6) 
motion involving disputed facts, “the plaintiff would be entitled to some pre-trial discovery, raising 
the likelihood that the defendant might settle”). 
 281.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 282.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 283.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 3.  See also Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, supra 
note 208, at 664–65 (“[T]o the extent judges have become freer in resolving factual disputes, both in 
granting summary judgment and in reviewing jury findings, the procedural consequences of the 
jurisdiction/merits confusion may become less practically significant.”). 
 284.  See Steinberg & Flanagan, supra note 278, at 839. 
 285.  See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (stating that 
remand over the difference between a 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion was unnecessary “[s]ince 
nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on” the distinction).  
 286.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–800, 817–20 (1993). 
 287.  F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164–69 (2004). 
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jurisdiction.”288  The legislative history agrees that “[i]f a court determines 
that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, [the FTAIA] 
would have no effect on the courts’ ability to employ notions of comity.”289  
If the FTAIA is ultimately considered to be substantive, jurisdiction is 
assumed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 so long as a non-frivolous Sherman Act 
claim is asserted, and courts will therefore be able to dismiss cases based on 
comity concerns without establishing a domestic effect.290  However, if the 
FTAIA is considered to limit jurisdiction, the effects test will have to be 
satisfied to establish jurisdiction before the court considers international 
comity,291 which seems to be Congress’s intent in the legislative history.292  
These differences may also have implications for whether courts define 
“direct” broadly or narrowly, which will impact comity through the number 
of suits that are subject to the jurisdiction of American courts.293  
3.  Implications for Other Statutes 
If the competing approaches to the FTAIA are a result of the differing 
views of the Supreme Court and Congress, the resolution of those 
differences will have broad consequences.294  First, although Arbaugh rejects 
a categorical approach to determining the nature of a statute, the treatment of 
similar provisions is a factor in the “clearly states” analysis,295 and therefore 
the ultimate treatment of the FTAIA would be applicable to the analysis of 
the extraterritorial application of any statute.  If Congress unambiguously 
 
 288.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797 n.24. 
 289.  H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498. 
 290.  See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 291.  See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 292.  See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 293.  Circuit courts have applied two major definitions for “direct.”  See supra note 256 and 
accompanying text.  The Ninth Circuit, which treated the FTAIA as jurisdictional, adopted a more 
strict definition, while the Seventh Circuit, which treated the FTAIA as substantive, adopted a 
broader definition.  See supra note 262.  Therefore, it is possible that the approach to the FTAIA that 
carries the day will also define “direct.”  Judge Wood has noted that a jurisdictional reading of the 
FTAIA would mean that a ruling of jurisdiction by a district court would be entitled to deferential 
review by the appellate court, limiting the higher court’s ability to take international comity into 
account.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  This criticism will be particularly salient if the 
FTAIA is deemed jurisdictional and the lower courts adopt a broad definition of “direct,” opening up 
the possibility that a lower court will claim jurisdiction over attenuated conduct, and the appellate 
court will have difficulty dismissing for comity reasons. 
 294.  See infra notes 295–97 and accompanying text. 
 295.  See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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treats the FTAIA as jurisdictional, that act would confirm that Congress re-
classified section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as jurisdictional in 
enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, and would effectively overrule the holding of 
Morrison that the extraterritorial application of a statute is an element of a 
claim.296  That decision would have further ramifications for RICO because 
of its close relationship to the Securities Exchange Act and antitrust 
litigation.297  However, if Congress ultimately agrees with the holding in 
Morrison and treats the FTAIA as imposing an additional element of a 
Sherman Act claim, the legislature should clarify its use of jurisdictional 
language in the Dodd-Frank Act.298 
B.  How Should the Conflict be Resolved? 
Thus far, the lower courts have departed from the traditional 
interpretation of the FTAIA without any FTAIA-specific precedent from the 
Supreme Court, relying instead on application of the Court’s precedent in 
Arbaugh and Morrison.299  However, these courts have acted as though the 
only clear statement the legislature can make must be in the text of the 
statute,300 and in the process have overlooked the clear congressional intent 
found in the legislative history.301  Moreover, Congress’s response to 
Morrison should give lower courts pause before applying Morrison’s 
outcome to the FTAIA, particularly in light of the FTAIA’s clear legislative 
history.302  The Dodd-Frank Act signals that the Supreme Court and 
Congress have different ideas about whether the extraterritorial reach of a 
statute should be an issue of merits or of subject matter jurisdiction.303  If this 
is the case, the issue is clearly beyond the purview of the lower courts; 
instead, the Supreme Court should decide the question and Congress should 
have an opportunity to respond, either through inaction amounting to 
acceptance or through legislation that more clearly expresses that the FTAIA 
 
 296.  See supra notes 241–48 and accompanying text. 
 297.  See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 298.  See supra notes 241–48 and accompanying text. 
 299.  See supra notes 138–77 and accompanying text. 
 300.  See supra notes 150–66 and accompanying text. 
 301.  See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 302.  See supra notes 216–35 and accompanying text. 
 303.  See Painter et al., supra note 241, at 21 (stating that Congress’s language in the Dodd-Frank 
Act “might reflect a difficult point of law, on which the courts have reached contrary conclusions”). 
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is jurisdictional.304 
Whether or not there is a fundamental difference between the Supreme 
Court and Congress regarding extraterritoriality and subject matter 
jurisdiction will become clear in the coming years, as the Supreme Court 
more clearly articulates its views on jurisdiction305 and the legislature has 
ample time to consider and respond.306  In the meantime, it is not realistic for 
lower courts to avoid the jurisdictional issue completely.307  However, 
without further guidance from either the legislature or the Supreme Court, 
lower courts will find themselves in the difficult and inappropriate position 
of discerning a path between Supreme Court precedent and congressional 
intent. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In applying the “clearly states” test to the FTAIA, the text of the statute 
and the holding of Morrison provide the most compelling reasons for 
treating the FTAIA as substantive.308  However, if the purpose of the “clearly 
states” test is truly to “capture Congress’s likely intent,”309 due consideration 
should be given to Congress’s clear jurisdictional intent expressed in the 
FTAIA’s legislative history.310  If Congress’s reaction to Morrison in the 
Dodd-Frank Act is any indication, the FTAIA is caught up in a fundamental 
disagreement between Congress and the Supreme Court regarding whether 
the extraterritorial reach of a statute is a question of merits or of subject 
matter jurisdiction.311  Therefore, the resolution of the dispute is beyond the 
purview of the lower courts, regardless of any sound reasons the courts have 
used in their analyses.312  Instead, the most appropriate course is for the 
Supreme Court to intervene.313  Then, Congress will have the opportunity to 
 
 304.  See, e.g., supra notes 236–49 and accompanying text. 
 305.  Arbaugh and its progeny reflect a recognition of the clarity lacking in previous jurisdictional 
rulings and a desire to bring predictability to this area of the law.  See supra notes 98–99. 
 306.  See, e.g., supra notes 236–49 and accompanying text. 
 307.  See, e.g., supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
 308.  See supra notes 150–66, 185–201 and accompanying text. 
 309.  Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011). 
 310.  See supra notes 216–35 and accompanying text. 
 311.  See supra notes 236–307 and accompanying text. 
 312.  See supra notes 299–307 and accompanying text. 
 313.  See supra notes 299–307 and accompanying text. 
[Vol. 41: 861, 2014] A Fundamental Disagreement 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
902 
react and, either by action or inaction, resolve the debate.314  Until then, 
foreign companies and governments will bear the risk of participating in a 
global marketplace where the reach of United States antitrust law, and its 
potential interference with foreign legal systems, is uncertain and 
unpredictable.315 
Morgan Franz* 
 
 
 314.  Congress must have the last word because, as the Court in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. 
Shinseki noted, “Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label.”  131 
S. Ct. at 1203.  See also supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 315.  See, e.g., supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (illustrating different jurisdictional 
outcomes for foreign interests in antitrust cases decided within the Northern District of California 
between 2009 and 2012). 
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